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Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox: A Door to
the Federal Courts Opens Needlessly
I. Introduction
In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,1 the United States Su-
preme Court held that an action brought under section 36(b) of
the Investment Company Act (ICA or Act)2 is not a derivative
1. 104 S. Ct. .831 (1984).
2. Section 36(b) provides in relevant part:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered invest-
ment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the re-
ceipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by
such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such
investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action
may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder
of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such"
investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any
other person enumerated in subsection (a) [original section 36 of the 1940 Act) of
this section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments,
for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by
such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such
investment adviser or person. With respect to any such action the following provi-
sions shall apply-
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in
personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach
of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment
company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrange-
ments providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval
of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements provid-
ing for such compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment
company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate
under all the circumstances.
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained against any person other
than the recipient of such compensation or payments, and no damages or other
relief shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of such compen-
sation or payments. No award of damages shall be recoverable for any period prior
to one year before the action was instituted. Any award of damages against such
recipient shall be limited to the actual damages resulting from the breach of
fiduciary duty and shall in no event exceed the amount of compensation or pay-
ments received from such investment company, or the security holders thereof, by
such recipient.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
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action and, therefore, plaintiff shareholders need not comply
with the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.3 The Supreme Court's decision, affirming the
Second Circuit,4 resolved a conflict among the circuit courts.5
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, shareholders of
mutual fundsO need not make a demand on the directors of the
fund when challenging the reasonableness of advisory fees under
section 36(b) of the ICA. Although the Court's decision was
unanimous and, perhaps, uncontroversial, it unnecessarily pro-
vides shareholders with unbridled access to the federal courts to
seek judicial review of management decisions. Eliminating the
demand requirement shifts the initial forum for such challenges
from the corporate boardroom to the courtroom and deprives
the fund's management of the opportunity to seek a solution
without costly and protracted litigation.
This Note examines the Court's conclusion in light of the
extensive legislative history surrounding the enactment of sec-
tion 36(b). To provide an adequate framework for that examina-
tion, Part II of this Note reviews the historical development of
the mutual fund industry and the legislative proposals enacted
3. Rule 23.1 provides in pertinent part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce
a right of a corporation. .. . the corporation. . . having failed to enforce a right
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall
allege. . . with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors . . . and the reasons for his failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
4. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982).
5. See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 52 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1984) (No. 82-1592); Grossman v.
Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982). See infra notes 88-
98 and accompanying text (both circuits found that Rule 23.1 was applicable to § 36(b)
suits).
6. The term mutual fund is commonly used to designate the open-end investment
company. The mutual fund shareholder owns a proportionate share of the fund's pooled
assets. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 831. For a detailed description of investment companies, see
WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-49 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON
REPORT].
7. Any recovery from a § 36(b) action goes directly to the fund and not the share-
holders. Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For an example of
the high cost of § 36(b) actions, see Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 90 F.R.D. 665, 672-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ($2.82 million settlement of a § 36(b) claim).
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to guide its development. Part III presents the facts of the case,
the opinion of the Court, and Justice Stevens' concurring opin-
ion. Part IV traces the unclear and conflicting legislative history
of section 36(b) and suggests that the Court failed to consider
the complete history in light of its own decisions regarding the
implication of private rights of action under federal statutes.
The Note concludes that the demand requirement is relevant
and necessary to the management of mutual funds and does not
act as a deterrent to shareholders' legitimate complaints regard-
ing excess adviser fees.
II. Background
A. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds first came into existence in 1924.8 The funds
are owned by small investors who pool their resources to have
professional money managers invest their shares in a variety of
securities. The shareholders thus receive the benefits of large
scale investing while depositing only small sums of money.10
Mutual funds are typically organized by investment man-
agement companies, usually called investment advisers," which
provide professional investment advice. 12 The investment ad-
viser appoints the first board of directors of a newly formed cor-
porate fund.' 3 That board then enters into a contract14 with one
8. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
9. Id. at 7-9.
10. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Del. 1981). This
basic concept reflects the fact that mutual fund shareholders are proportionate owners of
the total portfolio of the fund. These shareholders may be able to own a percentage of a
certain investment they might otherwise be unable to afford. WHARTON REPORT, supra
note 6, at 7.
11. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4897, 4901. The statutory definition of an investment adviser is contained in
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19) (1970).
12. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IM-
PLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46-47 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY REPORT].
13. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 66-68. "The investment adviser usually is
well represented on the fund's board of directors and maintains effective control over the
fund." Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967) (statement of M. Cohen, SEC Chairman).
14. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 66. The ICA requires that a written contract
exist between the adviser and the fund. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1976). The contract is
1984]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
or more third parties who will manage the fund and provide in-
vestment services. In most cases, the party with whom the board
contracts to provide these services is the same investment ad-
viser who appointed the board.15 In return for its services, the
adviser receives a fee - traditionally one-half of one percent of
the net asset value of the fund."6 In addition to its fee for man-
agement and investment services, the investment adviser may
receive underwriting fees or brokerage commissions, if it also
serves in those capacities. 17
A mutual fund is characterized by the close relationship be-
tween the investment adviser, which creates the corporation and
appoints its board, and the board, which contracts with the ad-
viser for management services.' 8 The management of a mutual
fund is distinguished by its reliance on third party, or "external-
ized," management."9 This interrelationship gives rise to an in-
herent overlapping of functions and provides the potential for
several conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and
the board.2 0
required to specify "precisely" the adviser's compensation and must allow the fund the
right to revoke the contract without penalty, upon 60 days written notice. Id. § 80a-
15(a)(1), (3). Additionally, contracts for more than two years must be approved yearly by
the board or shareholders. Id. § 80a-15(a)(2).
15. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 66-67.
16. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 12, at 89.
17. "There have been three principal and interrelated sources of income and other
benefits that accrue to investment advisers . . . maintaining effective control over mu-
tual funds: (1) advisory and management fees; (2) payments for selling activities in the
wholesale and retail distribution of mutual fund shares [underwriting); and (3) brokerage
commissions. . . ." WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 28. The Report indicated that
management fees were the largest single source of gross income to the advisers, ranging
from 47.2% to 88.3%. Id.
18. Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1967) (statement of SEC Chairman M. Cohen).
19. "This 'externalization of management' is the most striking feature of the indus-
try's organizational pattern." PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 12, at 45. Explaining
this characteristic further, the Report stated:
The practice of buying investment advice and management from an external ad-
viser is one of long standing and was firmly imbedded in the industry at the time
that the Act (ICA] was under consideration. The Act permitted it to continue.
. . . [Elxternal management remains predominant even in the case of the largest
funds whose resources are clearly large enough to permit them to establish effi-
cient, well staffed, and well-remunerated advisory departments of their own.
Id. at 49-50.
20. Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1967) (statement of SEC Chairman M. Cohen).
[Vol. 4:727
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Specifically, conflicts can occur in the negotiation of advi-
sory fee contracts and in situations where the adviser serves as a
broker. In negotiating the fee, the fund directors face the com-
peting and conflicting interests of the adviser and the fund
shareholders." The adviser, which appointed the directors, seeks
a high fee while the shareholders want a low fee to maximize
their return on investment. Similarly, an adviser serving as a
broker has the incentive to increase its fee through frequent
portfolio transactions, since brokerage commissions are based on
the number of transactions completed.22 The transactions may
or may not be in the shareholders' best interest, but any trans-
action is in the interest of the adviser as broker. Thus, from
their inception through the 1930's, mutual funds were plagued
with abuses that resulted from their structure and accompany-
ing conflicts of interest.2"
B. The Investment Company Act
1. Statutory history
The Investment Company Act of 194024 was enacted to min-
imize the conflicts arising from the structure of the investment
companies as they existed in the early 1930's.15 The primary
purpose of the ICA was to curb abuses and restore confidence in
investment companies26 by preventing the intense self-dealing
which was characteristic of the industry.
21. Because the fund is so closely tied to the investment adviser, see supra notes 11-
15 and accompanying text, the directors will be less likely to bargain in the marketplace.
WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 29-30. "These findings suggest that the special struc-
tural characteristics of this industry. . . tend to weaken the bargaining position of the
fund in the establishment of advisory fees rates." Id. at 30.
22. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 32-33. This could work to the disadvantage
of the shareholder where the "extensive use of brokerage for rewarding dealers . . .
raises the question of whether there is a return of value to the shareholders in this type
of arrangement." Id. at 33.
23. Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 37-38 (1940).
24. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976)).
25. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4897, 4901.
26. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482 (1979) (noting that the ICA was an effort
to control conflicts of interest within the mutual fund industry).
1984]
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To accomplish this goal, the ICA introduced several proce-
dures intended to eliminate self-dealing. First, at least forty per-
cent of the fund's directors and the adviser had to be unaffili-
ated with the fund as defined by the Act.17 Second, the Act
prohibited most transactions in securities and other property be-
tween the investment company and its adviser or affiliated per-
sons.2 Third, all advisory contracts had to be approved by the
directors or by a majority of the voting shareholders of the
fund.2
These restrictions seemed to work well for a time since most
complaints regarding mutual funds were resolved without litiga-
tion.30 Nevertheless, with the rapid growth of the mutual fund
industry, 31 shareholder dissatisfaction with advisory fee arrange-
ments became more intense.32 Most of the dissatisfaction
stemmed from the inequities of the fee arrangement. Whereas
the per transaction cost of administering a fund would be ex-
pected to fall based on the economies of scale of a larger fund,"3
the traditional flat rate percentage arrangement 34 increased the
adviser's fee without a corresponding increase in management
burden.
The challenges3 5 to the fees were brought under section 36
27. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976).
28. Id. § 80a-17(a)(1).
29. Id. § 80a-15a. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Note, Private Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Ad-
visers: Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 147-48 (1971).
31. The bare statistics of the funds' growth from 1940 to 1960 are astronomical. The
net asset value of American mutual funds rose from less than $500 million in 1940 to
over $17 billion in 1961. See Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation - New
Frontiers For the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 74 (1962).
32. In 1959 and during the next several years, more than 50 lawsuits involving ad-
viser compensation were filed against some of the largest funds in the country. Eisenberg
& Phillips, supra note 31, at 74. The drafters of the act must have realized this and
provided for this contingency in § 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1976), which authorized
the SEC to make studies on the industry from time to time as it deemed necessary and
to report its findings to Congress. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4900.
33. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4897, 4902.
34. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del.
1970).
[Vol. 4:727
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of the ICA which provided for court review of advisory contracts
under a standard of "gross misconduct or a gross abuse of
trust." 6 This standard imposed a significant burden on a plain-
tiff shareholder to show that no reasonable board of directors
could have agreed to the contract absent a high degree of self-
interest.3 7 As a result of this almost insurmountable burden,
shareholders lacked a satisfactory means to effect judicial review
of fees."8
In keeping with the mandate of the ICA39 and in response
to the inadequacy of judicial review of the reasonableness of ad-
visory fees, ° the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
authorized a study by the Wharton School of Finance and Com-
merce.41 The major conclusion of the study was that unaffiliated
directors42 were "of restricted value as an instrument for provid-
ing effective representation of mutual fund shareholders. 4 3 In
addition to the Wharton Report, the SEC conducted its own
study regarding the state of the mutual fund industry.44 Its
study concluded that lawsuits initiated under the old standards
of section 36 had been largely ineffective due to the standard
imposed on the courts to judge the fees. 45 In response to these
36. Section 36 of the 1940 Act stated:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of
the United States or United States Court of any Territory or other place subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serving or acting in
one or more of the following capacities has been guilty, after the enactment of this
title and within five years of the commencement of the action, of gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust in respect of any registered investment company for which
such person so served or acts ....
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 789, 841 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976)).
37. See Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962).
38. "Shareholder resorts to the courts in connection with advisory fees [have] been
relatively ineffective in dealing. . . [with] mutual funds and their investment advisers."
PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 12, at 141.
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (regarding the SEC's power to author-
ize studies).
40. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
41. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6. This study was transmitted to Congress as the
Wharton Report in August 1962.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976) (defining the term affiliated director).
43. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 34.
44. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 12, at v-vi. This study reached Congress in
December 1966.
45. Id. at 11. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
1984]
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studies, Congress enacted several amendments to the ICA. s
2. The 1970 amendments
The amended section 36 of the ICA substantially incorpo-
rated the prior section 36 into the present section 36(a). 7 The
section, as amended, is intended to ease the burden imposed
under section 36 for challenging investment advisory fees.48 This
was accomplished by eliminating the standard of "gross miscon-
duct or a gross abuse of trust";49 in its place section 36(a) im-
poses a fiduciary duty60 on the investment adviser and its
burden of proof imposed on shareholders.
46. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4897, 4901. The three primary objectives of the amendments were: first, to
amend these sections of the ICA which pertained to investment company management
fees; second, to amend sections of the laws dealing with banks and savings institutions;
and last, to improve the administration and enforcement of the acts. Id.
47. Section 36(a) reads in pertinent part:
(a) The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of
the United States, or in the United States court of any territory or other place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serving or
acting in one or more of the following capacities has engaged within five years of
the commencement of the action or is about to engage in any act or practice con-
stituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of
any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts--
(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment adviser, or
depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter if such registered company is an open-end com-
pany, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976). Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat.
789, 841. See supra note 36.
48. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
49. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 789, 841. See supra
note 36.
50. The fiduciary duty standard was a compromise reached between the SEC and
the mutual fund industry. The original proposal by the SEC recommended a standard of
reasonableness, which was incorporated into the bills submitted to the House and Senate
in 1967. H.R. 9510, § 8(d), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967). The mutual fund industry
vehemently opposed the standard, contending that the fees were already reasonable and
that this new standard would lead to the institution of strike suits. Hearings on S. 1659
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 at 197,
201 (1967). The discussions between the SEC and the industry continued, with a basic
agreement that the "gross misconduct" standard was unduly restrictive and needed to be
changed. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 12, at 12-14. Finally, an agreement was
reached to set a fiduciary duty standard, although that term was never defined. S. 2224,
§ 20, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For a further discussion of the area, see Note, supra
note 30, at 150-54.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/8
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affiliates.5 1
Further, section 36(b) expressly provides that an action for
a breach of fiduciary duty may be brought by the SEC or a se-
curity holder on behalf of the investment company against the
investment adviser or any other person named as having a
fiduciary duty arising out of the receipt of compensation for ad-
visory services.5 The amendment was not a reflection that the
fees were too high; its purpose was merely to specify the stan-
dard to which the adviser would be held in fulfilling his fiduciary
duty and to provide for court enforcement under that stan-
dard. Section 36(b) vests the federal courts with exclusive ju-
risdiction for actions arising under that section.5 This jurisdic-
tional grant, while intended to establish a means of enforcement,
was not designed to authorize a court to substitute its business
judgment for that of a mutual fund's board of directors in the
area of management fees. In response to congressional concern
51. In addition- to the investment adviser, the following are also governed by the
fiduciary duty standard: any officer, director, advisory board member or depositor, or
principal underwriter of the investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
52. Id. See supra note 2 for the text of § 36(b).
53. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4897, 4902. The Report states:
Your committee recognizes the fact that the investment adviser is entitled to
make a profit. Nothing in the bill is intended to imply otherwise or to suggest that
a "cost-plus" type of contract would be required. It is not intended to introduce
general concepts of rate regulation as applied to public utilities....
This section therefore should not be taken as reflecting any finding by the
committee that the present industry level of management fees or that the fee of
any particular adviser is too high. Its sole purpose is to specify the fiduciary duty
of the investment adviser with respect to compensation, and provide a mechanism
for court enforcement of this duty.
Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5) (1976)
55. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4897, 4902-03. The Report states:
The directors of the mutual fund, like directors of any other corporation will con-
tinue to have a fiduciary duty to the fund with respect to their own compensation,
and, of course, will continue to have overall fiduciary duties as directors for the
supervision of all of the affairs of the fund....
... Indeed, this section is designed to strengthen the ability of the unaffili-
ated directors to deal with these matters and to provide a means by which the
Federal courts can effectively enforce the federally-created fiduciary duty with re-
spect to management compensation. The section is not intended to shift the re-
1984]
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that the judiciary might usurp the role of the directors, the
drafters included section 36(b)(2)." Section 36(b)(2) provides
that a court, in making its determination regarding the reasona-
bleness of the adviser's fee, should give as much consideration
"as [it] deems necessary under all the circumstances" to the fact
that the board of directors approved the investment adviser's
compensation contract.5 7 It was the intent of the drafters that a
responsible determination by the board regarding management
fees was not to be ignored by the courts. 8
3. Implied causes of action and judicial interpretations
under the ICA
a. Supreme Court decisions
Supreme Court decisions prior to Daily Income Fund, Inc.,
v. Fox" had not directly involved the question of whether a mu-
tual fund has an implied cause of action under the ICA. The
Court has, however, developed a considerable body of case law
regarding implied causes of action under federal statutes.
In 1964, the Court in J.L Case Co. v. Borak,e ° recognized a
private cause of action under a federal statute which did not ex-
pressly provide for one. The Court held61 that a private cause of
action could be implied to effectuate the congressional purposes
of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
Eleven years later, in Cort v. Ash,65 the Court enumerated
four factors to be used in determining whether a private cause of
action should be implied from a statute not expressly providing
one. The four factors were:
sponsibility for managing an investment company in the best interest of its share-
holders from the directors of such company to the judiciary.
Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976). See supra note 2.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976). See supra notes 14, 29 and accompanying text
regarding adviser contract approval.
58. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4897, 4903.
59. 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984).
60. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
61. Id. at 430-31.
62. Id. at 432-33 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)).
63. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
[Vol. 4:727
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(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether there is an indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one;
(3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff;
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to
state law."
The Court has since refined its analysis under Borak and
Cort; the inquiry now turns on "whether Congress intended to
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of ac-
tion."" Recently, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran,"s the Court examined a provision of the Com-
modities Exchange Act which expressly provided for a right of
action by the SEC. In finding that a private right of action ex-
isted in the corporation, the Court stated that:
In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a
federal statutory scheme .. .the initial focus must be on the
state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted ...
When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied
private right has already been recognized by the courts . . .the
question then is whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-
existing remedy.67
The Court determined that a review of the legislative history of
the statute prior to the amendment indicated that an implied
right of action was "uniform and well understood."" Therefore,
since there was no clear indication that Congress intended to ne-
gate the prior remedy, the amendments were intended to aug-
ment and not to replace that remedy.69 Presumably, this guiding
64. Id. at 78.
65. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (emphasis added).
See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). The Court
in Transamerica concluded that the intent of Congress was the most important consider-
ation to review. Id. at 15-16.
66. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). The Court was reviewing § 4(b) of the Commodities Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976), which had been subjected to amendment following its
enactment.
67. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 378-79 (em-
phasis added) (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 380.
69. Id. at 394-95.
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principle would be relevant to the inquiry of whether Congress
intended an implied cause of action under the ICA.
b. Private cause of action under pre-amendment section
36
Prior to the 1970 amendments to the ICA, in Brown v. Bul-
lock, 0 the Second Circuit recognized the mutual fund's private
right of action under section 36 to challenge the reasonableness
of the advisory fee.71 In Brown, the court addressed the issue of
whether Congress had implicitly precluded an action by the
fund under section 36 by expressly authorizing the SEC to chal-
lenge fees. 72 The lower court had rejected this argument, reason-
ing that Congress had clearly intended to protect the investment
company, as well as its investors, and that in so doing it empow-
ered the fund itself to enforce its rights in a "private action. '73
The Second Circuit, in affirming the district court, implicitly en-
dorsed its conclusion that the fund was entitled to challenge ad-
viser fee arrangements.74
In Burks v. Lasker,75 the Supreme Court, although not di-
rectly deciding the issue, implicitly acknowledged the fund's
right to bring suit.7 6 In Burks, the Court was called upon to de-
cide whether the disinterested directors of an investment com-
pany could terminate shareholder derivative suits brought
against other directors under the Investment Advisers Act
(IAA)77 and the ICA.7 8 The Court held that Congress had not
70. 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
71. Id. at 236-40. Section 36, prior to its amendment, expressly authorized an action
by the SEC. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found an implied right of action in the
fund. Id. See also supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (concerning the original § 36
and its subsequent amendments).
72. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. at 245.
73. Id.
74. Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
75. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
76. Id. at 475-76.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976). The Investment Advisers Act (IAA) was one of six
companion statutes enacted at the time of the ICA. In deciding the issue before the
Court in Burks, Justice Brennan noted the following concerning the independent
director:
Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem through the
Act's independent-directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies
such as complete disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers. . . .Congress
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intended to impose a "flat rule that directors may never termi-
nate non-frivolous derivative actions involving co-directors. ' '17 In
deciding the issue of the directors' ability to terminate the
shareholder action as an exercise of its business judgment, the
Court accepted in dicta that the shareholder had "implied, de-
rivative causes of action under the ICA and IAA." 0
c. Post-amendment decisions and Rule 23.1 demand
requirement
Subsequent to the 1970 amendments to section 36 of the
ICA, the circuit courts consistently accepted the Second Cir-
cuit's conclusion, and the Supreme Court's implicit endorse-
ment, that the mutual fund possessed an implied cause of action
under section 36 to challenge advisory fees.81 Most recently, the
entrusted to the independent directors of investment companies, exercising the
authority granted to them by state law, the primary responsibility for looking af-
ter the interests bf the funds' shareholders .... [Ilt would have been paradoxical
for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon "watchdogs" to protect
shareholder interests and yet, where the "watchdogs" have done precisely that,
require that they be totally muzzled.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 483-85 (footnotes omitted).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976). In response to the suit by the shareholders, the board
of directors formed a committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the merits of the
claim and determined that, in the best interest of the shareholders, it should move for
dismissal of the action. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 474. The district court agreed, rea-
soning that the business judgment rule permitted the directors to terminate litigation
not in the fund's best interest. Id. at 474-75. See infra note 80 for a discussion of the
business judgment rule.
79. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 481-82.
80. Id. at 475-76. The business judgment rule discussed in Burks is a rule of corpo-
ration law which immunizes management from liability for actions taken within their
corporate powers, and involves the exercise of due care and compliance with their fiduci-
ary duty. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONs AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPISES § 242 (2d ed. 1970).
The test established in Burks for termination of a shareholder suit by the directors
was: (1) whether state law permitted the disinterested directors to terminate the action;
and (2) whether the state termination rule was consistent with the federal policy behind
the appropriate section of the ICA. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 480. For a thorough
discussion of the business judgment rule and the Burks decision, see generally Note,
Termination of Section 36(b) Actions by Mutual Fund Directors: Are the Watchdogs
Still the Shareholders' Best Friends?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 720 (1982).
81. The Burks Court, referring to Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), noted: "Other Courts of Appeals have agreed with the Second Circuit that the
ICA and IAA create private causes of action." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 476 n.5. The
Court cited the following cases as authority for the existence of private causes of action
1984]
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First and Third Circuits have addressed the question of the
fund's implied cause of action in the context of shareholder suits
under section 36(b).8 2 The First and Third Circuits concluded
that the existence of a fund's action qualified a shareholder's ac-
tion as derivative and, therefore, a shareholder had to make a
demand on the board of directors pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the
Federal Rules of Procedure."3
i. Rule 23.1 demand requirement
Under Rule 23.1, the shareholder bringing a derivative ac-
tion must show that a demand was made on the company's
board of directors prior to his filing the complaint or state in the
complaint why the demand would be futile.84 The predecessor to
the current Rule codified a Supreme Court decision which cre-
ated the requirement that a demand should be made upon the
board prior to bringing suit.8 5
The demand requirement under Rule 23.1 serves several im-
portant functions. It allows the directors to perform their role by
correcting problems presented internally, rather than by pro-
under the ICA: Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir. 1971); Hirpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 476 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963).
82. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 52 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1984) (No. 82-1592) (the case was remanded
to the Third Circuit to consider it in light of Fox); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982).
83. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d at 930; Grossman v. Johnson, 674
F.2d at 118, 126.
84. FaD. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See supra note 3 for the text of Rule 23.1.
85. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). The Court listed four situa-
tions in which a shareholder may bring a derivative action. There must have been: (1)
some action by the board which was beyond the corporations authority by charter; (2) a
fraudulent transaction by the board which would result in serious injury to the corpora-
tion or the shareholders; (3) some illegal action by a majority of the shareholders in the
corporate name, which violates the minorities rights; or (4) some action by a majority of
the board, acting in their own self interest, which is destructive of the corporation or the
rights of the other shareholders. In addition, the shareholder must show that he/she has
exhausted all intercorporate remedies available. If unable to obtain relief from the board
through a concerted effort, the shareholders must be able to show why they were unable
to obtain that relief. Id. at 460-61. The Fox Court discussed the Hawes decision and its
subsequent codifications leading to the enactment of Rule 23.1. See Fox, 104 S. Ct. at
836 n.5.
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tracted litigation." The initial demand on the directors also al-
lows them the chance to review the issues presented and either
assume control of meritorious actions or cut off frivolous suits
brought solely for their settlement value.87
ii. Grossman v. Johnson and Weiss v. Temporary Invest-
ment Fund, Inc.
In Grossman v. Johnson,88 decided seven months prior to
Fox, the First Circuit held that in enacting section 36(b), Con-
gress neither repealed nor limited the demand requirement, and
that an allegation of the directors' acquiescence in setting the
fees was insufficient to excuse the requirements of the Rule. The
court concluded that the express language of section 36(b), pro-
viding that an action be brought on behalf of such company,
normally indicates that the action is in fact derivative in na-
ture.89 After reviewing the extensive legislative history of the
statute, the court concluded that Congress had not intended to
repeal or limit the demand provision of Rule 23.1.90
The court* also addressed the plaintiff shareholders' conten-
tion that a demand on the board of an investment company was
a futile exercise and, therefore, the requirement to make the de-
mand should be eliminated.9 1 The court noted that in adding
section 36(b), Congress deliberately strengthened the role of the
independent directors in their dealings with adviser fee
arrangements.92
86. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d at 940-41.
87. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 168, 172 (1976).
88. 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. at 121-22. The court also noted the fact that no provision restricted the
funds use of § 36(b): "We cannot believe, however, that, for example, a new and indepen-
dent board of directors, intent on recovering excessive fees. . . would be precluded from
suing under section 36(b)." Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted). The court noted the substan-
tial benefits to the directors which § 36(b)(1) provided, "expressly, remov[ing] the need
to allege or prove 'personal misconduct' on the part of any defendant." Id. at 120 n.8.
This makes it easier for the board to commence the action. Id.
91. Id. at 121.
92. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court had dealt with this issue in Burks
v. Lasker. Id. at 121 n.12. The court indicated that although the statements in Burks
may technically be considered dicta, "the Court's observation formed an integral part of
its reasons for holding that the directors had broader powers under other parts of the
1984] "
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Similarly, the Third Circuit, in Weiss v. Temporary Invest-
ment Fund, Inc.,9 held that actions under section 36(b) must
comply with Rule 23.1. The Third Circuit found the legislative
history extensive but unclear. 4 Noting that the language of sec-
tion 36(b) provides expressly for actions by the SEC or a secur-
ity holder, the court nonetheless concluded that a private right
of action existed in the fund itself.9 The court observed that the
general thrust of the statutory scheme is to preserve the role of
the independent directors rather than to make the courts the
decisionmakers in setting investment adviser fees.96
The Third Circuit expanded the analysis for finding an im-
plied cause of action to include consideration of the Cort v. Ash
test. 7 After a thorough review of the legislative history of sec-
tion 36(b), the court concluded that an analysis of all four
prongs of the Cort test indicated that the investment company
itself had a cause of action under section 36(b)."
III. The Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox Decision
A. The Facts
Martin Fox was a shareholder in the Daily Income Fund,
Inc., an open-end investment company (mutual fund)." Reich &
Tang, Inc. (R&T) was the fund's investment adviser. 100 R&T
was paid an annual fee for its services, one-half of one percent of
the fund's net asset balance, irrespective of any fluctuation in
Act. The statement was by no means gratuitous or obiter." Id.
For a discussion of Burks v. Lasker, see supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
93. 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 930.
95. Id. at 934. The court noted its agreement with the First Circuit decision in
Grossman. Id. For a discussion of Grossman, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
96. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d at 937.
97. Id. at 934-35. The Third Circuit recognized that the implication of a corporate
right of action from a statute expressly bestowing the right to sue in the shareholder was
somewhat atypical; nevertheless, the court considered the test to be a valid measure of
the power inherent in the statute. Id. at 934 n.8. For a discussion of Cort v. Ash, see
supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
98. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d at 936.
99. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 833 (1984). Open-end funds offer
securities to the public on a continuing basis and are legally obligated to repurchase
those shares at their current net asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1976).
100. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 833.
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the fair market value of those assets." 1
Because of this flat fee arrangement and the dramatic
growth of the mutual fund industry in general, the fees paid to
R&T escalated astronomically without a corresponding increase
in the services required of it.1'0 Fox, as a shareholder in the
fund, questioned why the investment adviser should receive such
inordinately high fees for services which were substantially iden-
tical to those performed prior to the fund's growth. 03
Fox brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging that the management of
the fund's assets was a routine task and that the increased fees
were based solely on the growth of the fund's assets and not on
increased management costs.'" Rather than ask the board of di-
rectors to demand a return of the excessive fees,' 0' Fox alleged
in his complaint that no demand was required under ICA sec-
tion 36(b).' 0' R&T responded by moving to dismiss for failure to
comply with Rule 23.1.107
The district court noted that there was a divergence of
opinion on this issue within the Second Circuit. 0 8 Nevertheless,
it concluded that the requirements of Rule 23.1 were applicable
to section 36(b) actions and dismissed Fox's complaint.'0 9 The
101. Id. at 833.
102. Id. The net assets of the Daily Income Fund, Inc. experienced a dramatic
growth in a relatively short period of time. In 1978, the funds net assets were worth
approximately $75 million. Less than three years later, those assets had reached a value
of almost $775 million. Based on the flat rate of one-half of one percent, the fees paid to
Reich & Tang by the fund rose from $375,000 in 1978 to approximately $3,875,000 in
1981. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 250 (2d Cir. 1982)). Section
36(b) expressly makes any action under the ICA a federal question. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(b)(5) (1976).
105. For a discussion of the policy justification behind Rule 23.1, see supra notes 84-
87 and accompanying text.
106. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 1982).
107. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 834.
108. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). There had been disa-
greement among the district courts in the Second Circuit itself on whether a Rule 23.1
demand was required in a § 36(b) suit. Compare Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that Rule 23.1 applies to § 36(b) suits) with Blatt v. Dean
Witter, 582 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that § 36(b) actions differ from the
traditional derivative action suits and therefore Rule 23.1 does not apply).
109. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F.R.D. at 98-99.
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Second Circuit reversed, holding that the demand requirement
of Rule 23.1 was inapplicable to suits brought under section
36(b). 110 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
question of whether an action under section 36(b) of the ICA is
exempt from the demand requirement of Rule 23.1.'
B. The Decision
1. Opinion of the Court
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that the de-
mand requirement of Rule 23.1 does not apply to suits brought
under section 36(b) of the ICA.1 2 He cited three reasons for
reaching this conclusion. First, violation of the rights asserted
under section 36(b) requires a remedy which can be enforced
only by the SEC or a security holder of the company.111 Second,
the investment company does not have an implied right of ac-
tion under section 36(b)."' Third, the term "derivative action"
defines the scope of Rule 23.1 and limits its application to those
actions which the investment company itself can bring.11 5 Since
no express or implied cause of action exists in favor of the fund,
the action is not derivative and, therefore, not subject to the de-
mand requirement of Rule 23.1.116
Justice Brennan's analysis began with a review of the scope
of Rule 23.1. He examined the judicial development and previ-
ous interpretations of the Rule,1 7 and determined that the Rule
is restricted to those actions which can be "brought by one or
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corpora-
tion [when] the corporation has failed to enforce a right which
110. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d at 262.
111. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 833.
112. Id. at 842.
113. Id. at 838.
114. Id. at 839-42.
115. Id. at 834-38.
116. Id. at 842.
117. Id. at 834-38. Justice Brennan concluded that the Hawes requirements were
"designed to limit the use of the device [derivative actions] to situations in which, due to
an unjustified failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropriate 'to permit a
shareholder to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corpora-
tion."' Id. at 836 (citing Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881)).
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may properly be asserted by it."" 8 Accordingly, the Court had to
determine whether the right asserted under section 36(b) could
be enforced by the fund in its own right. 19
In determining whether the fund had a cause of action
under section 36(b), the Court looked to the language of the
statute. As Justice Brennan noted, the statute provides that
"[a]n action may be brought . . . by the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission or by a security holder.' ' 2 0 Justice Brennan
concluded that "[b]y its terms, then, the usual cause of action
created by § 36(b) differs significantly from those traditionally
asserted in shareholder derivative suits.' 2 1 Based on the lan-
guage of the statute, the Court concluded that the remedy pro-
vided by it can be enforced only by the SEC or a security holder,
and not by the investment company itself.122 Since it found no
express authorization for the fund to bring an action to recover
excessive advisory fees, the Court addressed the position urged
by the fund that an implied cause of action exists in favor of the
fund under section 36(b).12 3 This contention was based on the
Court's prior decisions governing implied causes of action.
2 4
Justice Brennan began with an analysis of congressional intent,
focusing on the procedure surrounding the passage of the Act
and the discussions concerning the new standard of fiduciary
duty established to govern board actions.'25 The Court observed
that "Congress rejected a proposal that would have expressly
made the statutory standard governing adviser fees enforceable
by the investment company itself and adopted in its place a pro-
vision containing none of the indications in earlier drafts that
the company could bring such a suit.' 2 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the Senate Report indicated that even though share-
holder and director approval of advisers' contracts was to be
given serious consideration, "such consideration would not be
118. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 834-35 (citing Rule 23.1) (emphasis omitted).
119. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 838.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 842.
123. Id. at 839.
124. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implica-
tion of private rights of action.
125. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 839-41. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
126. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 840-41.
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controlling in determining whether or not the fee encompassed a
breach of fiduciary duty.112 7 Thus, according to the Court, Con-
gress did not intend to create an implied cause of action in favor
of the corporate fund.
Justice Brennan concluded by reviewing the Cort v. Ash"'8
factors. 29 Without any detailed explanation, he found that al-
though the fund was undoubtedly in the class to be benefited by
the legislation, the shareholder's express cause of action was suf-
ficient to vindicate the company's right.130 Furthermore, he con-
sidered section 36(b) to have created an entirely new right and,
therefore, not to have been enacted in a context where a previ-
ous implied private remedy was already recognized by the
courts."3 1 Finally, Justice Brennan determined that the tradi-
tional law governing corporations was to be determined by refer-
ence to state, not federal law.13 2
2. Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that
even if the action were to be considered derivative in nature,
Rule 23.1 was concerned solely with the adequacy of the plead-
ings and was not a condition precedent to a shareholder suit.'33
127. Id. at 841 (citing S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4897, 4910).
128. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
129. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 841-42. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Cort v. Ash.
130. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 841.
131. Id. at 841-42. By calling the remedy under § 36(b) a "new right," Justice Bren-
nan was able to ignore the Merrill Lynch analysis. Id. See supra notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text discussing Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
132. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 842. Id. at 841. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Without explanation the Court overruled the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Weiss v.
Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), regarding its Cort v. Ash analy-
sis. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
133. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 842 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concluded that
the plain wording of the statute made it clear that the Rule did not require demand, but
only that the complaint allege whether or not a demand had been made. Justice Stevens
reviewed the history of the Rule and concluded that as originally enacted, the Rule did
not require a demand to be made; this requirement had been judicially created in Hawes
v. City of Oakland. Id. at 842 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Hawes v. City of Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1881)). See supra note 85. Justice Stevens supported this construction
with an analysis of the Rules Enabling Act which states that federal "rules shall not
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Justice Stevens concluded that the rule would be applicable only
if it were considered an implicit intracorporate procedural
requirement. 184
Justice Stevens, in an analysis paralleling the Court's review
of the express language of the statute, concluded that had Con-
gress intended to include a demand requirement it would have
explicitly stated as much.1"5 He also considered the policy justifi-
cations for a demand requirement and found that its use in the
context of a section 36(b) suit would frustrate the basic purposes
for which the Rule was designed. 36
IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court, in reaching its conclusion in Daily In-
come Fund, Inc. v. Fox5 7 that the investment fund does not
have an implied cause of action under section 36(b), concen-
trated solely on the legislative history of the 1970 amend-
ments."3 ' The Court found the history relatively clear and con-
cise, and concluded that there was no indication that Congress
intended to imply a private right of action for the fund."3 9
That the Court found the legislative history clear is some-
what surprising. Several circuit courts, reviewing the same his-
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 843 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
134. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 843 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens framed the
issue for resolution as "whether [a] federal statute that expressly creates a cause of ac-
tion that the shareholder may maintain on behalf of the mutual fund implicitly condi-
tions that express right on an unmentioned intracorporate procedural requirement." Id.
at 843 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 843 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens specifically noted the fact
that the fund directors were involved in the approval of the adviser contracts. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1976)).. See supra text accompanying
note 29. Justice Stevens also accepted the Burks holding that the fund directors could
not terminate shareholder suits. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979)). He was concerned with the statutory provi-
sion limiting recovery of fees paid one year prior to the commencement of the suit. He
believed that this, coupled with the inability of the directors to terminate a suit, would
simply allow the directors to collect more excess fees and therefore, frustrate the policy
behind the statute. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(b)(3) (1976)).
137. 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984).
138. Fox, 104 S. Ct. at 840-41.
139. Id. at 839-41.
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tory found it unclear as to whether Congress intended to create
an implied remedy.140 Moreover, the Court's unexplained em-
phasis on the legislative debates to the exclusion of pre-amend-
ment developments caused it to overlook the importance of a
statement in the Senate Report: "[TIhat subsection (b) specifi-
cally provides for a private right of action should not be read by
implication to affect subsection (a).""' This statment seems to
indicate that any rights previously existing under section 36 con-
tinue to exist under section 36(a).
Since there was no clear congressional mandate restricting
any rights existing under section 36, it was incumbent upon the
Court to examine that section as it existed prior to the amend-
ment.1 42 As the Court stated in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran,14 3 "[w]hen Congress acts in a statutory
context in which an implied private remedy has already been
recognized . . . , the question is whether Congress intended to
preserve the pre-existing remedy."1 44 Had the Court followed
the analysis it prescribed in Merrill Lynch, perhaps it would
have reached a different result in Fox.
The Merrill Lynch analysis would have revealed the impor-
tance of the Senate Report statement, regarding the effect of the
addition of subsection (b), in light of the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Brown v. Bullock.1 45 The Brown court determined that
an implied derivative cause of action existed in the mutual fund
under section 36.146 It expressly dismissed the argument that
Congress implicitly precluded the fund's remedy by specifically
140. See, e.g., Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 935 (3d Cir. 1982)
(noting that contradictory conclusions could be drawn from the legislative history); Fox
v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 258 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the extensive legisla-
tive history neither approves nor disapproves suits by the fund itself); Grossman v. John-
son, 674 F.2d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 1982) (describing the conflicting legislative indications
regarding the roles of the directors).
141. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4897, 4911.
142. Section 36 of the ICA was substantially incorporated into the 1970 amend-
ments as § 36(a). See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
143. 456 U.S. 353, 378-79 (1982).
144. Id. at 378-79. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
145. 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961). See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
146. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. at 245.
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authorizing the SEC action. 147 In addition, the Supreme Court
in Burks v. Lasker 4 8 had implicitly accepted the Brown ration-
ale. In Burks, the Supreme Court noted that the fund sharehold-
ers have "implied, derivative causes of action under the ICA." 149
Thus, it is arguable that the analysis prescribed by Merrill
Lynch would reveal that the fund still possessed an implied
cause of action in its favor under section 36(b).
With Brown and Burks as a basis for recognizing a section
36 derivative action, Merrill Lynch would then require that a
court extend its review of the amendment in light of the previ-
ously recognized right. Had the Fox Court followed this analysis,
it would have had to determine whether the rights which appar-
ently were judicially recognized under the pre-amendment sec-
tion 36, had been expressly diminished or curtailed by the
amendment.
A more thorough review of the legislative history would
have revealed that the intent behind section 36(b) was to en-
hance the pre-existing remedy under section 36.150 The Senate
Report accompanying the ICA stated that subsection (b) was en-
acted to "specify that the adviser has a fiduciary duty with re-
spect to compensation, and provide a mechanism for court en-
forcement of [that] duty."1 " The history is replete with
references to the congressional goal of "strengthen[ing] the abil-
ity of the unaffiliated directors to deal with" the problem of
management fees.152 Furthermore, the Chairman of the SEC
cited to the remedy created under Brown in his testimony. In
response to questioning, the Chairman stated : "[T]he commis-
sion has consistently supported the recognition of private rights
of action . . . . The courts have generally accepted our [the
SEC] position." 5 ' This direct reference to the Second Circuit's
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opinion regarding the existence of the private right of action
should have been an indication to the Fox Court that the
amendments did not eliminate the fund's remedy under section
36. In addition, the Chairman further stated that section 36(b)
did not "leave the door open to [a] nuisance action, [since there
exist] adequate safeguards under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and this bill to prevent unjustified shareholder litiga-
tion." 1 " These statements by the Chairman suggest that Con-
gress enacted the amendments on the assumption that the
protections provided by Rule 23.1 remained intact, although ad-
mittedly the reference is ambiguous.
From these indications of legislative intent, it is arguable
that the Court's analysis concentrated too much on the procedu-
ral aspects of the bill's passage and too little on the conflicting
statements underlying those actions. Although the absence of
clear congressional indication regarding the pre-existing rights
under section 36 does not automatically render section 36(b) ac-
tions derivative, the Court may have passed over, too quickly,
the legislative indications that Congress sought to strengthen
the director's role in determining fee arrangements.
V. Impact of the Decision
Striking down the demand requirement of Rule 23.1, as ap-
plied to suits brought under section 36(b), raises two problems
related to the purposes of the Rule. One purpose served by the
Rule is to allow the directors to assume their proper role as
managers of the fund.155 Although it has been noted that the
directors upon whom the demand is served usually are the very
same directors that originally negotiated the fees,15 e allowing the
directors to review the fees at the behest of the shareholders
permits them to fulfill their corporate role and coincides with
the purposes of the ICA. References in the legislative history to
2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearing] (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge) (citing to
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961)).
154. Hearing, supra note 153. (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge) (empha-
sis added).
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Congress' effort to strengthen the role of the independent direc-
tors,157 and the fact that the courts have recognized that they
should not presume the self-interest of the directors, " lead to
the conclusion that the directors should be left to perform their
managerial function subject to ultimate judicial review for man-
agement's failure to fulfill its statutorily created fiduciary duty.
A second purpose of Rule 23.1 is to allow the board to re-
view and prevent expensive and frivolous litigation. 15 9 Eliminat-
ing the demand requirement creates the possibility that the al-
ready overcrowded court dockets will become even more
crowded with unwarranted litigation. Even with the internal
controls of the ICA,' 60 the opportunity to challenge what may be
viewed as excessive fees for unknown services may lead to un-
necessary access to the federal courts. One court has even noted
that the provisions of Rule 23.1 may be necessary to preclude
creating a market in vexatious advisory fee suits."'
The Court appears to have taken a needless step to provide
adequate relief to the shareholders. Even with the requirements
of Rule 23.1, the shareholder is not barred from seeking judicial
review."6 2 The Rule simply requires that the board be given the
initial opportunity to consider the complaint. The shareholders
are not deprived of a remedy in the event an unyielding board
refuses to consider the demand. Rule 23.1 provides a forum in
federal court once the plaintiff has submitted a properly pleaded
complaint and the board has not responded to the shareholders'
demand." It would appear that the relaxation of the demand
requirement impinges on a legitimate management function and
157. See supra notes 27-29 & 55 and accompanying text.
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adviser must be approved by the shareholders, and the remedy for suits brought under §
36(b) is limited to actual damages sustained within one year from the commencement of
the suit).
161. Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. at 554 n.10 (concerning the contemporaneous
ownership requirement of Rule 23.1).
162. Rule 23.1 plainly states: "[T]he complaint ... shall allege ... with particular-
ity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the
directors ... and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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will create an excessive burden on the courts.
VI. Conclusion
In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,'" the Supreme Court
held that a shareholder need not make a demand on the direc-
tors of a mutual fund pursuant to Rule 23.1 when challenging
the mutual fund adviser's fee under section 36(b) of the ICA.
The Court reasoned that a suit under section 36(b) is not deriva-
tive, since there is neither an express nor implied cause of action
in favor of the fund. Because the action is not derivative, share-
holders should not be required to present their complaints to
the fund before seeking judicial review of the reasonableness of
the adviser's fee.
The Court's conclusion permits shareholders to circumvent
the procedural safeguards normally afforded by Rule 23.1 for
suits brought on behalf of a corporation. The shareholder is now
free to pursue his challenge in federal court without first
presenting it to the board. This result represents an unnecessary
interference with the managerial function performed by the
board and a further burden on already overburdened dockets.
Requiring that a shareholder comply with Rule 23.1 would as-
sure adequate respect for the business judgment of the fund's
board, without jeopardizing the shareholder's interest in ob-
taining judicial review of advisory fees. It is unfortunate that the
Court disturbed this balance created by the Rule 23.1 demand
requirement.
Richard John Olson
164. 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984).
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